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Is That All There Is, Is That All There Is, ...
The
Fed on October 31, 2007, unanimously agreed to lower the Discount rate
by 25 basis points to 4.5% from 4.75% (the rate charged between
overnight bank-to-bank for lending). At the same meeting, a decision was
made to reduce the Fed Funds rate to to 4.5% from 4.75% - although there
was one dissenting vote, the Fed's general comments strongly discouraged
expectations of another cut at the next meeting on December 11, 2007. We
had several immediate reactions -- none of which were particularly
favorably, with the one exception of the Peggy Lee's haunting. "Is That
All There Is? Is That All There Is? And the Fed made is perfectly clear,
yes, that's all there is (...sorry Peggy,
unlike your song, no one keep dancing or brook out the booze -- well
maybe a few people did).
After out little journey down
memory lane with Peggy Lee,
our next reaction was that the Fed had pandered to the markets, an
action which it is fundamentally opposed to and would painstakingly
resist in the future. Next, Chairman Ben Bernanke was facing a stock
stock market that had widely anticipated a rate cut, on the morning of
the Fed's action's Fed watches were forecasting a 90% reduction -- not
to have taken taken down would have had an unimaginable adverse effect.
Despite Bernanke's and the other member's struggling with the rippling
effect of tumbling home prices and correlated effect on the
financial markets and general economic. The next major macro predicament
facing the Fed is surging oil and other commodity prices, such as gold
which has reached $817 an ounce, dangling at a 27-year-high,
combined with an ever weakening dollar. To further complicate
matters, inflationary threats merely underscore the combined above
tensions. Nevertheless, the Fed recognized the negative effect no action
would have but was not shy about it future intension. The October 31st
reduction was "an accommodation" rather than a "sincere adjustment" --
and that future rate adjustments in the next few meetings should be
scaled back to zero.
The excerpts from the Fed's October 31st
meeting are very telling since despite its "official" stated policy,
there is a tendency for an unofficial behavioral policy which becomes
apparent over the course of time and tends to drive "official" actions.
We are still in that development stage with Ben Bernanke. Our reading
behinds the words (...or "between the commas"),
is that this Fed does not believe the Fed should or perhaps can deal
with the multitude of differing problems currently facing the nation. In
our view Ben Bernanke appears to shaping up to a pure monetarist and
according so no compelling reason to use rate cuts to stimulate, for
example, the faltering housing crisis. Financial physics, however, would
seems to dictate, that the lower mortgage payment burden can be made for
homeowners, the less the lower probability for troubled loans and
mortgagee lenders which in a considerably better position to work
through problems with their borrowers. It seem that dealing with the
broad effects of the credit crisis would have a greatly benefit effect
on the economy -- and the best best to achieve this goal, to place cheap
money in the hand of consumers.
In the interim the stock
market has move up and move down -- that what market do. The troubling
aspect of this market, is that is cannot pass the same question we asked
of ever company and market, specifically: What is going to market this
market go up. We have no answer. Had the been inclined to lower the Fed
Funds rates, we would have found that a major incentive. But we feel,
that the ripple effect of the credit crisis will have a pervasive effect
on the the economy for many quarter and in many sectors -- we think
recession has a better that even chance unless and until monetary policy
market money extremely cheap. Next year should market for interesting
headlines when politics and policy will need to find the greater good
(... that is for themselves). We do not
very a healthy economy or stock market when technology and precious
metals are become attractive investments.
The Risk Premium
Differential Is Illustrating A Resistant Market
The risk
differential indices for the week ended November 9, 2007 have confirmed
a trend in place since since early October -- namely to display a
market that cannot demonstrate a sustainable bullish trend at this point
. Risk premiums all ended
higher:
-
The Industrial
Risk Premium end 6.31% versus 6.20%
-
The
Utility Risk
Premiums 5.72 % compared to 5.55%
-
The Transportation
premium, the perennial exception rose to 7.06% from 6.77%.
This market is showing no
signs of "wanting" to rally. Favorably third quarter earning reports
merely sustain a price increases for days suggesting that the financial
community has little confidence in future earnings power. The
market is apparently sending it message, but the administration does not
appear to be on the receiving end. n
|
Date |
November 9, 2007 |
Date |
November 16, 2007 |
|
DJ Industrial Risk Premium |
6.31% |
DJ Industrial Risk Premium |
6.26% |
|
30 Year Treasury |
4.65% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.57% |
|
Industrial Risk Differential |
1.66% |
Industrial Risk Differential |
1.69% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Date |
November 9, 2007 |
Date |
November 16, 2007 |
|
DJ Transportations Risk Premium |
7.06% |
DJ Transportations Risk Premium |
7.13% |
|
30 Year Treasury |
4.65% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.57% |
|
Transportation Risk Differential |
2.41% |
Transportation Risk Differential |
2.56% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Date |
November 9, 2007 |
Date |
November 16, 2007 |
|
DJ Utility Risk Premium |
5.72% |
DJ Utility Risk Premium |
5.77% |
|
30 Year Treasury |
4.65% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.57% |
|
Utility Risk Differential |
1.07% |
Utility Risk Differential |
1.20% |
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