|
RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS:
For The Week Ended: October 24, 2008
IT
IS DIFFICULT TO BE BULLISH AS CONSUMERS LOOSE BUYING POWER
THE WEEK IN
REVIEW
I would like to bring some good news to investors
for a change (I’m starting to feel like
the Grinch who stole Christmas) but the Risk Premium numbers
are what they are and they are not good. All three sectors of the Dow
have virtually given back the “coat-hanger” gains made last week. The
Dow Industrials closed at 8,378.95, down 473.27 and Transportation fell
214.29 to 3,448.44. Utilities posted a slight 0.9 gain, ending the week
at 353.70. By comparison though to the previous week, when the Dow sank
though the 8,000 level only to rise above 9,000 during intraday trading,
the past week look like a sleepy seaside holiday.
THE SELLING CYCLE
Many funds, for example state pension funds, have
found themselves in a difficult position, one which is putting selling
pressure on the market. They are finding themselves in the unenviable
position of having to sell stock to meet their cash obligations. And the
debt markets are throwing off less cash and some investments have
actually gone cash- negative as, for example, commercial real estate.
This has forced these funds (and many of them are sizeable) to sell
stocks to raise large sums quickly. Unfortunately, this is not where the
story ends. What have been only paper losses are now real losses and
states, for instance, will have to tap various public venues to
replenish the shortfalls. Furthermore, some have been hurt by corporate
dividend cuts or scaled back expectations. Ironically, when the dust
settles the best opportunities to recoup these loses will be in stocks
and carefully selected fixed-income securities.
WHERE IS THE
BOTTOM?
Fasten your seatbelts. The Dow could trend towards
7,000 but in a somewhat less volatile pattern that we have witnessed
over the past year. Last
year’s P/E of 20x could be 2009’s 10x and, depending upon the taxing
policies of the new administration, the slump could extend deep into
2010. Unfortunately, the markets will continue to spike on promising but
fleeting good news, only to fall back again when reality sets in,
deflating expectations. The underlying reason, in short, is that despite
the billions thrown at the financial industry (and some will have a
beneficial effect) virtually no money appears to be directed at the
heart of the problem, namely, hard-pressed mortgage holders. Until this
happens, we do not expect to a meaningful reversal in U.S. and global
markets.
THE HOUSING
EQUATION
As interest rates began to move higher during the
first half of 2006, a phenomenon began to surface wherein house prices
suddenly started to seem expensive. Around August 2007 it was evident,
well before the macro statistics detected trouble brewing, that
individuals were feeling financially pinched and behaving accordingly.
Homeowners had used their homes as asset collateral by taking out home
equity loans based on the accreted value. Some speculated in new home
/condo developments that they could not afford while others began to
consider their home as a retirement fund. Homes had become multiple
sources of capital as consumers used them as a source of leverage.
But, at about the same time house prices began to
fall, many of the initial artificially low adjustable-rate mortgages on
them were due to be reset. What had been bargain rates suddenly were
turning into nightmares for many homeowners who saw their monthly
payments jump to unaffordable levels on properties that were suddenly
worth less than the mortgages.
Then came the foreclosures and the slump which we seem to be
stuck in despite the efforts of central banks to stem the market
freefall and provide liquidity to the banking system.
TIME TO HIT THE
REWIND BUTTON
If politicians and investors hit the rewind button
to the inception of this financial crisis, what they would see is:
·
Abnormally low interest rates. You would
have to turn back the clock to the post-Depression years to find rates
as low those in experienced in recent times. The giveaway rates --
surprise, surprise-- stimulated heavy consumer spending across the
board, especially in housing.
·
Excessively liberal and lax lending
policies. These lulled borrowers to take out loans based on
unrealistically high appraisals of their homes. Suddenly everybody was
speculating, the neophyte and professionals alike, hoping to cash in on
the seemingly unending rise in property values.
Flipping properties became the new route to wealth for the
easy-money set. But of course it couldn’t and didn’t last.
·
Second mortgages/letters of credit on
primary residences. Bankers, spurred on by lucrative bonus payments,
could not get homeowners to sign up fast enough for the incredibly low,
interest-only loans. (At some point I
will delve into the multiplier effect of income/wealth and its role in
this bubble)
There is no one cure-all but a good start would be
for the banks to do all they can to help work out new affordable
mortgages for homeowners in danger of defaulting. This would probably
mean forcing banks and the owners of the mortgages to re-appraise the
properties realistically and base re-issued mortgages on the inevitably
lower valuations. Of course
the banks would have to take a hit on the write-downs.
Perhaps this is where the government could step in with
off-setting tax credits among other things.
WHAT WE EXPECT IN
THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD
Election choices will undoubtedly affect the
availability of cash and credit and thus the duration of this bear
market. But until the government begins to deal more directly with the
housing issue, it’s difficult to make a solid case for a sustainable
bull market. Post election, the market is likely to continue its erratic
behavior. Expect a presidential election rally, then an easing when
euphoria gives way to reality.
Later, the inauguration should send stocks higher as every new
appointment will be characterized as “out with the old and in with the
new.” Inevitably there will be the post-inauguration blues, but not to
despair: It’s a new beginning and we Americans are an optimistic lot—at
least that’s what our leaders will be telling us.
§
The Industrial Risk Premium ended at 9.56% versus 9.09%
§
The Transportation Risk Premium increased to 8.43% from 8.21%
§
The Utility Risk Premium increased to 9.75% from 9.74%
n
|
Date |
October 17, 2008 |
Date |
October 24, 2008 |
| Total DJ
Industrial Risk Premium |
9.09% |
Total DJ Industrial Risk Premium |
9.56% |
| 30 Year
Treasury |
4.32% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.11% |
|
Industrial Risk Differential |
4.77% |
Industrial Risk Differential |
5.45% |
| |
|
|
|
| Date |
October 17, 2008 |
Date |
October 24, 2008 |
| Total DJ
Transportations Risk Premium |
8.21% |
Total DJ Transportations Risk Premium |
8.43% |
| 30 Year
Treasury |
4.32% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.11% |
|
Transportation Risk Differential |
0.43% |
Transportation Risk Differential |
0.21% |
| |
|
|
|
| Date |
October 17, 2008 |
Date |
October 24, 2008 |
| Total DJ
Utility Risk Premium |
9.74% |
Total DJ Utility Risk Premium |
9.75% |
| 30 Year
Treasury |
4.32% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.11% |
| Utility
Risk Differential |
5.42% |
Utility Risk Differential |
5.64% |
| © 2008 Whitehall Financial Advisors LLC |
Continues ▼

Continues ▼

Continues ▼

For Additional Information or Questions Please
Contact
Us. |