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RISK PREMIUM
STATISTICS
RISK PREMIUM
ANALYSIS: THE
11th Rule
For The Week Ended:
October 10, 2008
THE 11th RULE
“Interest means very
little when principal is at risk”
One of the
questions I am asked most frequently is how I uncovered the Enron house
of cards several months in advance.
There is nothing mysterious about it; I used the 10 fundamental
rules of security analysis (posted on our website
www.wfin.net). I’m amending
that list to include an 11th rule: “Interest means very
little when principal is at risk.”
This guideline was
given to me by my mentor at Standard & Poor’s (forget
the year, it’s not important), Al Copeland, a very
wise and hardened analyst.
For Wall Streeters this rule is self-evident, for neophytes it bears
elaboration. It simply
means that when investors and lenders perceive that their investments
and loans are at serious risk, the rate of return (interest, dividends)
should be disregarded.
Certainly this is a variable underlying the current lending seize-up at
the interbank and retail levels.
The preservation of
capital, regardless of the rate of return offered, has been taken to
heart anew by banks. This principle is diametrically opposed to the
conventional Wall Street wisdom that “everything has a price” which, to
investor dismay, has been seriously challenged if not disproved.
Hence, we are adding this criterion to the
“Ten Ways On How To Avoid The Next Enron,” notwithstanding the fact
that is does not explicitly pertain to Enron’s circumstances.
ARE WE THERE YET? ...NO
Stocks lost 1,974
points or 18.15% of their value during the week, with the Dow’s Jones
Industrial Average’s closing the week at 8,451.19, its lowest level
since
April 25, 2003.
Since peaking at 14,164.53 the Dow has declined 40.34%.
After a period where stocks have
fallen so precipitously, a rally should be expected in short order but
we feel that an upward spike would be a classic Bear Market trap and
should not be interpreted as the widely hoped for “bottom.”
Our Risk model indicates that
that the Dow Industrials could reach 7,500.
At this level stocks should
begin to consolidate and form a base from which a sustained rise in
stocks is probable. A dip down
into the 7,000 region may not be reached until mid-2009, with
intermittent advances along the way. In short, our model does not
indicate a steep downward slope.
While there is a
long list of reasons to conclude that this bear market has not yet run
its course, some of the prominent reasons are:
§
Risk parameters as
reflected by P/E multiples have yet to be re-established.
While stocks and bonds may appear “cheap” relative to the figures
posted last year, we feel that a systemic alteration in equity
valuations is underway. Our Risk Premium Model leads us to conclude that
the cost-of-risk curve is shifting higher.
In short, stocks do not appear “cheap” considering historic
valuation points, especially 2007 valuation measures.
§
Based on key technical
indicators, such as the market breadth, selling sentiment exceeds buying
sentiment.
§
As long as house prices
are falling, it is difficult to envision the “quality” of the loan
portfolio’s of financial institutions increasing.
In addition, as the world
economy slips deeper into recession and unemployment increases, there is
a “real” chance that despite healthier Balance Sheets, lenders are
likely to display less willingness float funds at the “retail” level,
thereby impairing an overall economic recovery. This does not bode well
for prospects of restoring the profitability of financial institutions
(notwithstanding advances made on the Capital side of the Balance Sheet
and improved liquidity from the sale of “toxic securities.”
§
Government interventions
in markets will require time to demonstrate that they “can be” and “are”
effective, extending uncertaintywell into 2009.
§
Banks and other
financial intermediaries are still in the process of validating their
balance sheets.
§
The money flow freeze is
not confined to interbank /wholesale transactions. Lending at the retail
level remains extremely inhibited, pointing to a broader problem,
namely, the “fear factor.”
Lenders of all types are exhibiting an overwhelming aversion to
extend credit to corporate or individual borrowers,
§
Until recently, earnings
prospects by many U.S. corporations benefited by a continuous,
international demand for goods and services. Once it became apparent
that foreign economies were weakening, U.S. stocks lost a critical
element of resilience. As
far as timelines go, we place the loss of investor confidence that
global economies would pick up the slack at around May of this year.
§
Bear markets typically
end with a whisper, not a bang. October 10, 2008 will go
down (at least, so far) as being the most volatile trading day in
the history of the Dow, with the average swinging 1,019 points during a
single trading session.
§
Energy prices should
remain volatile, moving in tandem with global economic performance,
since we are currently facing a globalslowdown much of the upward
pressure on oil & gas prices seems to be alleviated.
RISK PREMIUM MODEL
ILLUSTRATES THAT A NEW VALUE EQUILIBRIUM HAS NOT BEEN REACHED
Our Risk Premium
model suggests that stocks are not offering investors adequate returns
to induce significant buying activity.
The Dow Industrial Risk Premium for the week ended October 10, 2008 advanced
to 9.53% from 7.89% the previous week.
The Dow Transportation and Utilities also moved higher, with the
Transportation Risk moving to 8.66% from 8.19% and the Dow Utilities
10.64% versus 8.39%.
THE SEARCH FOR
NEW VALUE BENCHMARKS...IS 10% A KEY LEVEL?
We feel that 10%
could become a pivotal discounting figure.
There have been two financings using preferred stocks having 10%
stated dividend rates, plus equity enhancements.
If preferred stocks need to return a nominal 10% this might serve
as a glimmer of hope for new discounting rates.
However, since the transactions in question involved financial
institutions, this may render the rate an inapplicable guideline to
other sectors of the market.
When integrated
with our Risk Premium Model, however, common stocks may need to offer
prospective rates of return in excess of 10%.
Under various scenarios, the model points toward persistent
volatility in the equity markets, with the major trend being lower.
Furthermore, it is likely that mini-rallies may be experienced
but, at this point, we feel such moves are more likely to be bear market
traps. That being said, a sustainable reversal is
apt to occur when least expected. Finally, regardless of who
wins the presidential election, the element of “certainty” is likely to
benefit the market.
§
The Industrial Risk Premium ended at 9.53% versus 7.89%
§
The Transportation Risk Premium increased to 8.66% from 8.19%
§
The Utility Risk Premium increased to 10.64% from 8.39%
n
|
Date |
October 3, 2008 |
Date |
October 10, 2008 |
| Total DJ
Industrial Risk Premium |
7.89% |
Total DJ Industrial Risk Premium |
9.53% |
| 30 Year
Treasury |
4.11% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.15% |
|
Industrial Risk Differential |
3.78% |
Industrial Risk Differential |
5.38% |
| |
|
|
|
| Date |
October 3, 2008 |
Date |
October 10, 2008 |
| Total DJ
Transportations Risk Premium |
8.19% |
Total DJ Transportations Risk Premium |
8.66% |
| 30 Year
Treasury |
4.11% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.15% |
|
Transportation Risk Differential |
0.03% |
Transportation Risk Differential |
0.36% |
| |
|
|
|
| Date |
October 3, 2008 |
Date |
October 10, 2008 |
| Total DJ
Utility Risk Premium |
8.39% |
Total DJ Utility Risk Premium |
10.64% |
| 30 Year
Treasury |
4.11% |
30 Year Treasury |
4.15% |
| Utility
Risk Differential |
4.28% |
Utility Risk Differential |
6.49% |
| © 2009 Whitehall Financial Advisors LLC |
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